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Abstract. This article examines the interaction of organisational and technological changes adopted by parties to respond to7
members’ demands for more participation. We develop a term, platform politics, and create a framework for identifying how8
parties use platforms to open or close intra-party decision-making. The framework is then applied to two institutionalised parties9
(PSOE and PD) and to two movement-based parties (Podemos and M5S) of the changing party systems of Spain and Italy. We10
conclude that the tensions between existing organisational structures and the use of internet-based platforms create a series of11
unintended consequences for parties, which result in potentially disruptive outcomes.12
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1. Introduction14
Western European party systems have recently had to deal with the consequences of latent political15
resentment, new social cleavages and disenchantment with political institutions. All these factors have16
bolstered a wave of strong electoral performances across the political spectrum by new parties, to the17
detriment of institutionalized parties. This wave has notoriously included movement-parties,1 such as18
the Spanish Podemos, the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), and the Greek SY.RIZ.A. This transfor-19
mation has been paralleled by the emergence and consolidation of online platforms offering parties the20
opportunity to rearrange their relationship with members and the electorate.21
Although these online platforms represent a promising tool for parties to improve representation and22
decentralise internal party governance, they put participatory pressure on parties with hierarchical struc-23
tures (Gustafsson, 2012, p. 1,123; Esteve del Valle & Borge, 2013; Esteve Del Valle & Borge, 2018) and24
blur their classic strategy based on a sharp differentiation between party members and the public at large25
(Margetts, 2001; Löfgren, 2003). In response, parties offer organisational resistance to decentralising26
power and are diffident about relying on incipient technologies to adopt intra-party decisions (Esteve27
Del Valle, 2015; Borge & Esteve Del Valle, 2017).28
∗Corresponding author: Alberto Lioy, Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA. E-mail:
alioy@uoregon.edu.
1Movement-parties present similarities to traditional political parties – given their links to the institutional political arena and
their participation in the electoral competition – and to social movements – given their organisational structure and repertoire
of action (Kitschelt, 2006).
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Parties are political actors with primary goals (Harmel & Janda, 1994) and organisational characteris-29
tics, which behave strategically to win elections and influence policies. To this aim, they can use online30
platforms, yet this use can put a strain on those parties’ organisations. While many political parties seem31
to have adopted at least some online tools, the implications of the relationship between party organisa-32
tions and the type of online platforms they have adopted are still unclear. In this article, we are interested33
in understanding the role played by technology in the organisational transformation of political parties34
at different levels of institutionalisation, and more specifically, the consequences of the use of online35
platforms by two institutionalised parties and two movement-parties from Southern Europe.36
To this end, we develop a term, platform politics, and use it to describe how parties use online plat-37
forms to facilitate members’ participation. Our analysis builds on previous research that examines how38
the design of online platforms reflects political values like decentralization of political power (Deseriis,39
2017). We develop an analytical framework for studying the relationship of parties’ organisational fea-40
tures and online platforms, stemming from a broader discussion of the crisis of representation, parties’41
new approaches to rank-and-file engagement, and technological solutionism (Morozov, 2013).42
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly examine the literature to explore the organisa-43
tional models of political parties that have been proposed to address the crisis of representation, with an44
emphasis on of stratarchy as a modern, more flexible kind of structure.45
Second, we look at how political parties have been collectively involved in the diffusion of ICTs46
(Information and Communication Technologies) and have established an online presence. We contend47
that parties might claim that their online presence makes them closer to the electorate, but attempts to48
disintermediate decision-making often fall short of creating real responsiveness and participation.49
Third, to set up the stage for interpreting the interactions between the organisational and technological50
side of the transformation, we introduce the concept of platform politics. We explain how institution-51
alised parties can incorporate online platforms strategically to meet their organisational needs and decen-52
tralize intra-party power. On the other side, movement-parties use platforms to sustain their popularity53
and uphold their claims to represent the people.54
Fourth, we explain the methodology of our research, rooted in a document analysis we have conducted55
to give meaning to parties’ use of online platforms.56
Fifth, we examine two institutionalised parties of the centre-left (PSOE and PD) and two movement-57
parties (Podemos and M5S) from Spain and Italy, to illustrate how platform politics plays out in different58
organisational conditions. Importantly, we argue that a series of unintended consequences for political59
parties appear as they adopt new forms of organisation and communication, leading to challenges that60
need to be addressed in order not to damage consensus. In particular, movement-parties tend to fall into61
a series of contradictions as they institutionalise, while the crisis of institutionalised parties has certainly62
not been solved through an inconsistent online presence.63
Last, we conclude our study with a series of questions aimed at outlining a research agenda that will64
be able to further evaluate the consequences stemming from our analytical framework and its empirical65
application.66
2. The transformation of modern political parties67
During the past five decades, political parties have gone through a slow crisis, testified by the weak-68
ening of traditional partisan attachments, the fall of party membership, and an increased volatility of the69
electorate. Given how established mass parties adopt catch-all strategies (Kirchheimer, 1966) to expand70
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In Western Europe this has then resulted in the creation of cartel parties (Katz & Mair, 1995): reacting72
to the weakening of their social links, parties developed a closer relationship with the state, to the point73
of owing their survival to public finance from taxpayers, rather than to ideological representation and74
membership dues, and policy evaluation becomes the main electoral issue.75
Some parties responded to electoral volatility by strengthening and isolating their internal organization76
from the electorate (Dalton, 2000); others tried to fix the trust deficit by opening internal decision-making77
(Ignazi, 2014). Most of these experiments have had a narrow scope, as the opening of party decision-78
making from a closed group of leaders to ordinary citizens poses a double principal-agent problem (Katz,79
2014). It is hard to act on behalf of the traditional supporters while also opening to broader spectrum of80
voters; many parties delegate some functions to an internal democratic process, while restricting most81
other decisions to party leaders.82
Alternatively, for Enyedi (2014) the representational challenge should be framed as an identity prob-83
lem. Conceding decisional authority to new constituencies can weaken the party brand, producing an84
ideologically inconsistent party facing uncertain electoral prospects, where ideologically-sound local85
candidates must follow a broad and vague party agenda to preserve internal unity. In turn, neglecting86
the ideological preferences of core constituencies undermines their confidence in the party, and weakens87
partisan identification.88
In the following subsections, we explore two types of strategies adopted by political parties in the89
wake of this transformation, as an attempt to offer solutions of organisational and technological nature.90
2.1. The organisational response: The emergence of stratarchy91
In response to the pressure to create internal democracy, Carty (2004) suggests that parties have tran-92
sitioned to a new organisational model, the franchise model, which depicts party organisation as re-93
sembling a fast food chain that decentralizes some decision-making to allow for regional variations in94
member affiliation, candidate selection, and policy agendas. This model is based on Eldersveld’s (1964)95
idea of stratarchy, where different organisations within the party (e.g. central leadership, parliamentary96
party, party in the electorateGroningen . . .) are hierarchically ranked, but can follow their own logic,97
with a certain degree of independence.98
Stratarchies can become more inclusive organisations than hierarchical parties, but broadening their99
electoral appeal can mean ordinary party members have more influence over strategy and personnel de-100
cisions than party activists (Carty, 2004). Bolleyer (2012) further discusses stratarchy as the intermediate101
point between two more traditional organisational forms for political parties: hierarchy, describing a top-102
down party structure, and federation, a decentralized configuration preserving the autonomy of different103
components of the party. She depicts stratarchy as the result of different strategic imperatives for the104
actors involved, with the leadership attempting to exercise control, and local branches trying to gain105
autonomy. Importantly, and in contrast with the rigidity of the old institutionalised mass party model,106
this elaboration portrays parties as flexible organisations, able to incorporate new structural elements,107
including online platforms.108
We argue that party stratarchies can arise from the metamorphosis of institutionalised political parties109
that try to reframe their internal power relationships, but also of more modern movement-parties that110
start as loose federations and institutionalise over time. Notice that the adoption of stratarchy does not111
force institutionalised parties to become more democratic, because the components of a party do not112
necessarily communicate, and the influence of the local party can be contained by leaders. The result is113
that many sceptical voters express frustration with superficial changes to party organisation by indicating114
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2.2. The technological response: The party goes online116
The crisis of representation in political parties took an unexpected turn with the advent of the Internet,117
and the consequent opening of new opportunities for internal communications. Gibson and Ward (1999)118
were among the first to observe that most parties developed internal networks for computer-based com-119
munication. They discovered that while parties were very sanguine about the deliberation possibilities120
offered by ICTs, from the onset they used these technologies for coordination and information rather121
than for organizational restructuring and debate.122
This view was soon counterbalanced by Hellen Margetts (2001) who by coining the concept of Cyber123
Party opened the door for a more optimistic stance on parties’ use of ICTs aiming to (a) democratize par-124
ties’ decisions; (b) promote new lax and informal interrelation networks; and (c) offer new possibilities of125
fundraising. A step in this direction was taken by Heidar and Saglie (2003) with their conceptualization126
of parties as networks. They argued that the Internet had the power to decentralize parties’ organizations127
into networks more open to members’ demands, to lobbies and to experts on public policies.128
In terms of participation and mobilization, results of early research showed a limited use of ICTs129
by party members. Pedersen and Saglie (2005) showed how only one in three Norwegian and Danish130
party members visited party websites. These authors even predicted a sharp division among active and131
passive members and argued that this tendency could empower party elites. In brief, instead of increasing132
collective participation in parties’ decisions, ICTs seemed to facilitate the “spiral of demobilization”133
(Vissers, 2009).134
In the light of these findings, some contend that internet-based participatory experiments rooted in135
technologists’ strong beliefs in the emancipatory nature of online communication are a form of techno-136
logical solutionism (Morozov, 2013). Political leaders view technological fixes for social and political137
problems as preferable to changes in internal policy, but since citizens with higher socio-economic status138
have more time and informational resources to respond, online measures of public opinion can often be139
biased (Rendueles & Sola, 2015).140
Lastly, in spite of its uncertain effects in terms of internal democratization, the technological revolution141
has been affected by existing party organization. Concerning the relation between parties’ characteristics142
and their online behavior, Padró-Solanet and Cardenal (2008), Padró-Solanet (2009), Cardenal (2011)143
and Esteve Del Valle and Borge (2013, 2015, 2017) showed that in Catalonia and Spain, parties’ orga-144
nizational characteristics and their position in the electoral market influenced the participatory channels145
offered on their websites. Furthermore, they discovered that large parties, especially when at the opposi-146
tion. tended to open more communication and participation channels on their websites (Cardenal, 2011,147
p. 95).148
3. Platform politics149
In the previous section we have introduced the technological and organisational aspects of the trans-150
formation of political parties. Now we propose to combine and observe them in their interaction, by151
introducing the innovative concept of platform politics.152
In our conceptualization we draw from O’Reilly’s (2011) observation that today, government should153
be conceptualized as a platform when it is obliged to address the complexity of aggregating public opin-154
ion data from a network of participants in a way that reflects their preferences. Although political parties155
interact with their members in a way that is different from how citizens interact with the state, in the156
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the adoption of online platforms. Specifically, we argue that political parties are using online platforms158
in an effort to reimagine interactions with their members and address the crisis of representation.159
Figuratively, a platform is the foundation of an action or event forming the basis for further achieve-160
ment (OED, 2017), and therefore in computer science, it has come to indicate an infrastructure that161
supports the design and use of applications, including hardware, operating systems, and mobile devices.162
Coupled with the architectural definition of a platform as a raised, horizontal surface, we see a platform163
as a “place or opportunity for public discussion” (MWD, 2017). On the other side, in politics, a plat-164
form is associated with the issues a candidate or party endorses, especially in the context of electoral165
campaigns.166
While in politics the term platform is normally used to indicate a specific set of policies, that is not the167
meaning we intend to convey. Our usage of the term points to its figurative and technological meanings,168
as we see online platforms more as a container, a structure, a tool for deliberation and the creation of169
shared content. This means that the two meanings (technological/architectural, political) operate at two170
different levels, as one can see an online platform as a vehicle for a specific political platform. More171
specifically, an online platform is assimilable to any other of the parts of a traditional party organization,172
such as a caucus organisation, a system of local branches, a network of recreational circles; it represents173
at the same time their technological evolution, and their complement.174
Although this is not the first time that the expression “platform politics” is found in an academic con-175
text, it has been used vaguely, and without being formally defined or operationalised, shifting between176
different meanings. Renzi (2011), in his academic summary of a conference titled Platform Politics,177
broadly used it to indicate any political usage of an online platform. Platform Politics was also a special178
issue of Culture Machine (Hands et al., 2013) which discussed the political implications of social media179
platforms, but did not define the concept any further. Last, Edwards (2018) used the term to discuss the180
political roles of platform-style websites such as YouTube, drawing from Gillespie (2010).181
In contrast with this uneven practice, we define platform politics as:182
the introduction of digital intermediaries (e.g. software applications, websites, social networking ser-183
vices) into the structure of political parties, to facilitate internal communication, engage in political184
decision-making, organize political action, and transform the overall experience of participation in185
political parties.186
At the opposites in the application of platform politics we outline two different styles: open and closed.187
An open platform is a platform that gives users the ability to reprogram its functions by providing them188
all the necessary information to do so. Contrarily, in closed platforms the control over the functionalities189
of the platform and the information to alter these functionalities is restricted to certain individuals. From190
an open perspective, platform politics has a utopian propensity to replace the traditional functions of191
parties and political institutions with more decentralized, participatory ones. We argue that the type of192
response to the crisis of representation that parties produce by practicing platform politics is contingent193
on the openness of the online platforms they use, and based on their ethos, licensing, governance, design194
and informational structure, as shown in Table 1.195
Ideally, open platform politics grant intellectual property rights for the platform, software applications,196
hardware, etc., to members of the party, citizens, or the public at large. Consequently, when citizens own197
their platforms or a broad license, the governance of a platform (including acceptable behaviour and use)198
becomes a shared collective responsibility. This typically involves transparent, negotiated exchanges199
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Table 1
Open vs. closed platforms
Features Questions Open platforms Closed platforms
Software
license






















– IP rights holders
Design/UX Who is at the center of the plat-
form design? Whose user expe-
rience is privileged?
Party members Party leaders
Information
flows
How is the information flow on
the platform structured?
Multi-directional Top-down
In contrast, closed platform politics grants intellectual property rights to private individuals who then201
license software applications, or dispose of the use of the platform under their own terms. Closed, pro-202
prietary platforms do not share governance responsibilities with party members or other stakeholders,203
gather information from members without having to produce feedback, and generally rely on rigidly204
structured roles.205
Note that, to a certain extent, the owners of a platform always limit participation, so that openness206
largely depends on the platform design, i.e. the rules governing how users interact with the platform.207
User experience is also inscribed within the technology of the platform, rooted in the technical expertise208
of designers and technology developers which remains unintelligible to most users. Inscribed platform209
governance can add one intermediary layer of flexibility and freedom, which the more closed forms of210
platform politics lack. A platform with multiple stakeholders can focus on user experience and meaning-211
ful political participation; on the other hand, a closed platform with exclusive governance by intellectual212
property rights holders tends to prioritize the generation of data and analytics to inform and shape or-213
ganisational or business decisions.214
The governance and design of a platform are in turn responsible for shaping the structure of political215
participation and the flow of information on a platform. It then becomes important to observe how infor-216
mation is exchanged through the online platform, and particularly by whom. Open platforms are ideally217
pushed to cultivate top-down and bottom-up flows of information between citizens and party leaders.218
Contrarily, closed platforms limit exchanges to top-down information flows; citizens are recipients of219
party information and services, but are removed from internal decision-making.220
Platform politics are appealing to movement-parties when they allow ‘the people’ to participate in221
shared decision-making, therefore they should privilege a platform that is tailored for rank-and-file mem-222
bers of the party. While not directly addressing populism in our work, we acknowledge that this language223
can fit within the thin ideology of the ‘good people’ against the ‘corrupt elites’ that populism proposes.224
In general, new, decentralized, internet-mediate parties offer an optimistic view of participation; instead225
of using robust party organisations to engage in collective action, citizens are directed towards the lean226
infrastructure of platforms. Proponents of a more developed online presence often overlook how democ-227
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Fig. 1. An organisational model of party-based platform politics.
When thinking about open platform politics, we naturally tend to associate them with a federative or-230
ganisation, where the freedom of the different souls of the party is extended to its internet branch, which231
then becomes another organisational layer for channelling participation. On the other side, closed plat-232
form politics fit well within the image of a hierarchical party organisation, where the platform serves the233
interest of the central party leadership and/or the parliamentary party and channels information coming234
from the top. This said, an important caveat lies in the fact that the theoretical correspondence between a235
model of party organisation and open or closed platform politics does not have to translate into practice,236
as party leaders have freedom over platform implementation.237
The following figure shows the two aspects on the two axes of a graph, and includes the ideal posi-238
tioning of an old, institutionalised mass party, and of a movement-based party at two opposite corners.239
Ultimately, the adoption of open or closed platform politics intersects with whether the party is will-240
ing to disintermediate control over core party functions like candidate selection, agenda building, and241
endorsing policies. Whereas more open organisational models of traditional political parties (stratarchy,242
federation) capture the dynamics of decentralization, movement-parties use online platforms to engage243
in disintermediation. When institutionalised political parties become stratarchies, party leaders are still244
in charge of elaborating the political strategy of the party. In contrast, disintermediation promises to245
reduce or eliminate the central party organisation, leaving members and MPs as the only elements in the246
party.247
But what happens when there is a mismatch between technology and organisation, so that the new,248
internet-based elements find themselves projected into a structure that they do not fit in? How has the249
real-life adoption of platform politics worked? Our research regards how these different combinations250
play out in practice. The next two sections consist of an explanation of our methods and of four brief251
case studies which aim to illustrate how different political parties are dealing with the adoption of some252
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4. Methods254
To understand political parties’ use of online platforms we employed a document analysis (Bowen,255
2009; O’Leary, 2014). We collected documents from the following sources:256
a) Public records: parties’ statutes (4), and strategic plans (2).257
b) Public documents: parties’ websites (4), social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter) (8), news-258
paper articles/blogposts (65).259
c) Physical evidence: handbooks (2), training materials related to parties’ use of online platforms (4),260
and apps (4).261
When conducting our analysis, we paid attention to the subjectivity of the source of the document262
and to the original purpose of the document, such as the target audience (Bowen, 2009), two biases that263
normally appear when employing qualitative methods (Bryman, 2006). This is particularly important264
when looking at internal party documents that aim to generate a positive impression of the party’s tech-265
nological efforts. The analysis employed in this research is an attempt to make sense of how parties’266
use of online platform affects the internal organization in terms of members’ political participation, with267
a specific focus on the points of tension and contradiction emerging from the interaction of the two268
elements.269
We expect future research to expand on our investigation by (i) studying the association between par-270
ties’ centralization of decisions and their online organizational behaviour (see Esteve Del Valle & Borge,271
2017); (ii) proposing a content analysis of media discourse, drawing from news outlets and focusing on272
parties’ online platforms; or (iii) conducting interviews with party cadres and party members to gain a273
qualitative insight on their organizational use of ICTs.274
5. Case studies275
Looking for examples of platform politics that correspond to different combinations between technol-276
ogy and organisation, we opted for a two-country, four-party design including both movement-parties277
and institutionalised parties.278
Our case selection was limited by the availability of cases, and the choice fell on two Southern Eu-279
ropean democracies frequently featured in comparative political research, Spain and Italy. In each case280
we selected a newer movement-based party that practices a form of internet-mediated democracy, and a281
large, institutionalised party of the centre-left, that has been recently in government, but is now facing282
a crisis of consensus. Spain’s Podemos and Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, or283
M5S) are two ideal cases, as they have made platform politics central planks of their strategy for shaping284
their party brand. On the other side we picked the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) in Spain,285
and the PD (Partito Democratico) in Italy, both of which proposed a distinctive approach to platform286
politics.287
Following the case selection, a series of preliminary comments are in order, that will then guide the288
case-by-case analysis. At a glance, Podemos and M5S might appear to be practicing the most open plat-289
form politics. Organisationally, they first appeared to the general public as shapeless, un-institutionalised290
political movements, chaotically coagulating to take the semblance of a party, but ready to welcome new291
members from all walks of life, and acting as a federation of civic circles (Podemos), or online and292
off-line meetups (M5S). Both parties played a strong emphasis on internet-mediated democracy, as an293
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On the other side, PD and PSOE are known to the electorate as stable, institutionalized party machines,296
capable of organising national campaigns and serving terms in government, with a history of discipline297
and organisational hierarchy coming from the days of mass membership and Marxist ideology. Their298
online presence almost came as an afterthought, as a consequence of the necessity to move with the299
times, and it is usually considered insufficient.300
The case studies then serve to transform these initial images and create an organisational picture that301
responds to reality, as all four parties move towards stratarchy, albeit coming from opposite directions,302
and creating different challenges. On the other side, their online presence is explored to understand (1) to303
what extent the movement-parties’ promises of openness are fulfilled in reality and if there are any com-304
ponents that appear instead closed; and (2) how the institutionalised parties cannot escape negotiating305
their online presence to open some form of intra-party democracy.306
Through these four case studies, the key trade-off is that championing self-organizing publics through307
shared platform government, citizen-to-citizen communication flows and platform-mediated direct308
democracy can severely limit the power of party leaders and MPs.309
5.1. Podemos310
Podemos is the main Spanish movement-based party, the long-term political outcome of the Indigna-311
dos movement that rose against austerity policies during the recent global recession. It has been success-312
ful electorally gathering around 21% of votes at the 2015 and 2016 Spanish general elections.313
Podemos matters to the context of platform politics because its core is animated by a simple goal:314
‘to develop free technologies that would allow massive online participation’ (Podemos’ Digital Heart,315
2016). To this end, Podemos’ online platform, Participa (‘participate’), has a GNU Aferro v3 General316
Public License that allows anyone to access the source code and copy, modify or improve the software.317
This software license affirms the party’s commitment to technological sovereignty: users share owner-318
ship of the platform and play a critical role to its internal governance, developing applications to improve319
the party’s democratic political culture.320
The affordances of building a platform around the principles of openness and technological321
sovereignty are that design features, user experience, and platform governance are continually rene-322
gotiated and improved through a transparent, ongoing conversation between developers, party leaders323
and citizens. Podemos’ core idea about the role technology should play in the organization of the party324
and its political actions, as stated in the party statute (Podemos, 2018), their ‘Organizational Principles’2325
and ‘Organizational Document’,3 and, of course, in Participa’s website.4326
A wide array of tools for collaborative governance has made Podemos’ organisational structure com-327
plex. While some features of Participa are still in the development stage, many others are available in-328
cluding: a mobile application for deliberation (Appgree), online voting, participatory budgeting, a third-329
party platform to circulate petitions on Reddit, a custom accounting tool for party finance (OpenERP),330
and a newsletter. The organisation of Podemos combines horizontal and vertical features; governance is331
localized, networked and scaled to the national level. Indeed, for Podemos ‘the method is the message’332
(Blitzer, 2014). Financial and political decisions are open and transparent, and there are opportunities for333
2web-podemos.s3.amazonaws.com/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/documento_organizativo_alta_03.pdf (Spanish:
Principios Organizativos).
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citizens to participate in voting and deliberation through online platforms, or in person. Elected officials334
are expected to be accountable to party members; all salary information and parliamentary activity is335
public.336
Despite the ambitious scope of Podemos’ model as a participatory, responsive and transparent party,337
some have decried these efforts as ‘window-dressing’. As Rendueles and Sola (2015) put it, ‘the use of338
open votes, can often feign democracy while concentrating power in the formal party leadership’. Pode-339
mos’s most recognizable leader, the Secretary General Pablo Iglesias, is a political science professor340
from Madrid, whose message in plain-spoken language has gained popularity during frequent TV ap-341
pearances. Some have accused Podemos of ‘Caesarism’, pointing out how everything the secretary wants342
is granted and the party ‘put[s] on a show of constant internal consultations, on already decided matters’343
(Garzón, 2015). In addition, it is worthy to remember Podemos’ platform has come across problems344
with the census of registered members. It seems that massive processes of online affiliation usually put345
to the test digital platforms when they start to function. Last, the structure that was ultimately adopted at346
the first Citizens’ Assembly was rather conventional, all of which makes Podemos’ organization on the347
ground closer to a stratarchy than to a federation.348
Such criticisms reveal the organisational challenge of platform politics for movement parties: incor-349
porating the rhetoric and the tools is easy, but relinquishing control over candidate selection and policy350
programs requires faith in an amorphous membership. So far, it has proved easier to democratize the351
party activity online than it has been on the ground. In the case of Podemos, the leadership appears to re-352
tain a significant degree of power to hedge against the decentralization of intra-party governance. There353
is actually a website quehacenlosdiputados.net (whatdoMPsdo?) to explain what elected officials are do-354
ing; ironically, it does not yet contain the promised information. Furthermore, instead of expanding the355
decision-making processes happening in ‘Plaza Podemos’, a subreddit (r/podemos) which transformed356
into a broad space for online deliberation (plaza.podemos.info), Participa serves mainly as a tool for the357
party leaders’ consultations, offering a more closed model of platform politics.358
One can argue that a certain degree of leadership is necessary to any organisation, but what mat-359
ters here is the disconnection between party members’ expectations and the reality of institutionalised360
politics.361
5.2. PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)362
Despite an established electoral base and 140 years of history, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party363
(PSOE), has recently lost support in Spanish parliamentary elections, seeing its vote share in legislative364
elections dramatically fall from 43.9% in 2008, to 22.6% in 2016. One of PSOE’s responses to this crisis365
of consensus, was to reinforce its online presence to show the electorate that it can meet pressures for366
more responsiveness and reform. The adoption of this approach is reflected in the strategic role that new367
computer-mediated forms of participation play in its internal organization, as stated in the party’s statutes368
(PSOE, 2017) and documents concerning its organization, like the Federal Regulation Developing the369
Federal Statutes5 (PSOE, 2017).370
PSOE’s approach to internet politics was put into practice through the creation of the online platform371
miPSOE, promising members a direct voice in the decisions of the party. The platform is restricted to372
members of the party who must register, provide personal identification and be approved. They are then373
offered an opportunity to participate in debates, propose policy ideas, take polls, provide suggestions374
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to the party, and join local party affiliates. PSOE has experienced significant challenges in using its375
platform to consult rank-and-file members and share authority in party governance.376
In the aftermath of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 2015, PSOE’s leader Pedro Sánchez, used377
the party’s online platform to put to a vote a possible coalition agreement with the centre-right party378
Ciudadanos. Members of the party were given 8 days to register on the miPSOE website (PSOE Con-379
sulta, 2016), and then they could vote online over two days, or in person at polling locations. The party380
collaborated with the technology company Add4u to verify online voters’ identities, protect the security381
of the vote, anonymize voting and make the entire system auditable. Despite the party’s efforts, from382
a total of 189,167 militants who could vote online, only 13,697 used that method.6 While the pact was383
narrowly approved, the agreement ultimately unravelled, leading to new elections in June 2016.384
Later that year, mass resignations from the PSOE’s executive leadership team ultimately pressured385
Sánchez to also leave his position. Throughout the process, there were concerns about how the leadership386
had structured the online vote. Voters were only given two options regarding the pact: ‘yes’ or ‘no’,387
with little debate about the terms, or who would serve as Prime Minister in case it was approved and388
electorally successful. This example shows how stratarchies can practice a form of platform politics that389
limits supporters’ participatory autonomy by narrowly constraining choice.390
PSOE’s recent history also reveals some, perhaps more trivial, but nevertheless crucial, challenges391
of platform politics. There have been problems with members’ registration concerning how members392
choose to enter the party; some members have been able to register on miPSOE as direct affiliates at the393
federal level without joining a municipal or district group, but others who wanted to participate through394
a local party organisation have had difficulty registering on the platform (Romero, 2017). Technical395
deployment problems can undermine the public’s confidence in the use of online platforms and in the396
overall assessment of the party’s technological competence. PSOE’s growing pains with online politics397
indicate that, in spite of efforts made to show that the party takes the concerns of its members seriously,398
the use of platforms to enhance the voice of members in the party’s strategic decisions creates logistical399
and technical challenges.400
As previously mentioned, stratarchies may face significant pressure to reform because of increasing401
electoral competition; their continued electoral success depends on showing responsiveness to public402
demands. Our claim is therefore that the adoption of some form of platform politics could have made403
a much more positive difference for the PSOE. The problems encountered in the implementation of the404
new tools might have emerged from the fact that the party embraced technology as a last resort when405
facing crisis, but without any radical change in its organisation on the ground and in its message to the406
public.407
5.3. M5S (Movimento Cinque Stelle)408
The emergence of the Five Star Movement on the national political scene of Italy had been pre-409
pared since the early 2000s through the bold ideological statements in Beppe Grillo’s satirical shows.410
It was launched in 2009, as a political movement proposing a five-pronged policy agenda based on411
free water, environment, internet connectivity, development and improved transportation. In parallel,412
the movement’s ideologue Gianroberto Casaleggio, preached a form of internet-based direct democracy413
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It promised a radical transformation of traditional party politics through disintermediation, with party415
representatives merely acting as spokespeople for the membership base.416
As a movement-based party M5S was incredibly successful, gathering a stunning 25% of votes in the417
2014 Italian general elections, and reaching 32.2% in 2018, which gave it access to government, and418
dramatically raised the stakes of the whole experiment. As a political formation lacking any previous419
institutional experience, M5S initially adopted an uneven and improvised kind of organisation. Vig-420
nati (2015) compared M5S’s structure to different models, including Carty’s franchise, showing how its421
lean infrastructure created a different-looking party in different localities. Its shape depends on its local422
electoral success, and on the presence of a national party manager, resulting in geographical variations423
between stratarchy and federation.424
A telling example of its modus operandi comes from the M5S’s first foray into local government. The425
appointment of Federico Pizzarotti as the mayor of Parma in 2012, was haied an epochal change, but426
his de-alignment with the leadership in 2016 resulted in his sacking from the party.7 This shows how,427
despite the relative degree of freedom of the local party, the leadership always has the last word, as all428
members are exposed to non-arguable sanctions from above.429
As for M5S’s online presence, its platform was launched in April 2016, called Rousseau to convey and430
image of trust in human nature and democracy. It was initially used to hold votes on the party programme431
(or ‘non-statute’), a code of conduct for MPs and EuroParliament-MPs, and on the party’s energy policy432
agenda, establishing an all-time record for online participation with over 80,000 voters (http://www.ilblo433
gdellestelle.it/2016/10/risultati_delle_votazioni_sul_non_statuto_e_il_regolamento_del_movimento_5434
_stelle.html). A series of similar votes followed, all with the same characteristics: little explanation given435
on M5S’ blog, and almost nobody voting against the proposals, making them basically online plebiscites.436
In only a few months participation fell under 20,000 members. In the leadership election of September437
2017 the national leader Luigi Di Maio easily prevailed, as all the other candidates were unknown to the438
general public (http://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/2017/09/il_candidato_premier_del_movimento_5_stelle439
_i_candidati.html); participation was under 40,000 members.440
At a glance, Rousseau looks both more open and more closed than Participa. For example, Rousseau’s441
source code is based on a proprietary content management system and is not publicly available (Deseriis,442
2017). On the other side, some features on the platform target people with no prior political experience443
through a number of peer-mentoring tools that train members on how to participate and to run for office444
(ibid.). Registered members can introduce, amend and comment on legislative proposals online, but445
selection criteria are unclear and results limited. For instance, in September 2016 the party announced446
that two of the legislative proposals drafted on Rousseau would be discussed in Parliament, a very447
small fraction out of a total of 193. Therefore, like Podemos, M5S has been accused of using its online448
platform to create the appearance of direct democracy while engaging in cybercratic centralism, as a449
technologically savvy organisation ‘with strong internal discipline and a centralization of all steering450
functions.’ (De Rosa, 2013).451
The lack of a national congress has also made it hard to coordinate the party line, and M5S’s new452
officeholders have made mistakes because of their inexperience. Even if more open platform politics lead453
to more responsive party leadership, they do not automatically produce competent MPs, and listening454
to amorphous crowds online cannot replace the value of expertise. An internal response towards party455
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signed a new code of conduct that further limits their personal freedom and increases the powers of the457
leadership.458
We believe that the M5S’s move towards stratarchy while maintaining a relatively open style of plat-459
form politics might result in a loss of identity and damage the party brand (Enyedi, 2014). Given the460
high expectations set by its technological infrastructure, and how internal party openness depends on461
Rousseau, M5S risks to soon appear homologated to traditional political parties and as ‘false prophet’ of462
direct democracy.463
5.4. PD (Partito Democratico)464
Founded in October 2007 as the latest reincarnation of the formerly Marxist mass party PCI-PDS-465
DS, Italy’s Partito Democratico (PD), has been subject to a number of internal transformations in its466
eleven years of life. To mark a discontinuity with traditional Italian party politics, the new party adopted467
primary elections for leadership at all levels, which triggered unforeseen consequences. Five primary468
elections for party secretary have since then taken place in the PD, the last two won by former Florence469
mayor Matteo Renzi, whose rise as an outsider with limited political experience, is key to this recent470
transformation.471
Renzi, a practicing Catholic, was the first leader not coming from the clique who had received its472
formation through the PCI, the Italian Communist Party (Guidi, 2015). Through a media campaign473
that presented him as close to the people (Ciaglia & Mazzoni, 2015), and as the demolition man of474
old politics, Renzi propelled himself to national-level notoriety in the 2012 primaries, and won the475
following leadership election in 2013, following Pierluigi Bersani’s resignation. He then moved on to476
make PD’s ideological appeal wide, following the tradition of both the Italian centre and left, drawing477
equal inspiration from Antonio Gramsci and Aldo Moro.478
PD’s permanence in government between 2013 and 2018 under a young and moderate leader, had479
opened the question of whether the party would adopt a modern online branch, and on March 10, 2017,480
Renzi boosted as an epochal change the upcoming introduction of an online platform. Its launch came481
together with the new online newspaper Democratica, which replaced the historical L’Unità, on March482
30; the platform was named Bob in honour of the late Robert Kennedy, one of Italy’s most esteemed483
foreign political figures. It promised to open the party to a broader base, and quickly catch up with484
political formations with a stronger online presence. Coherently, Bob’s website reads ‘A door open to485
everyone. A unique digital ecosystem, inclusive, collaborative. To be a protagonist of history’.8 It claims486
to promote transparency and go against a style of internet-based politics based on fake news and false487
publicity.488
On the other side, as a political magazine commented,9 Bob is a ‘complete disaster’ as a participatory489
tool. Bob’s platform is proprietary, and the information flow is mainly top-down, with no space for user-490
generated content, and its software is full of technical bugs. The amount of functionalities available is491
scarce, limited to the presentation of selected issues from Democratica promoted by the party leadership,492
plus an instrument for polling users, and a ‘proposals’ section that only contains a form where the user493
can contact the party staff. Oddly, and in contrast with Rousseau, MiPSOE and Participa, access to Bob494
8https://app.partitodemocratico.it/ (Italian ‘Una porta aperta a tutti. Un ecosistema digitale unico, inclusivo, collaborativo.
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does not require party membership, but only an affirmative answer to the question ‘Do you accept the495
values’ charter and intend to vote for PD?’ Discursively, one can find strong references to participative496
democracy, but in practice the platform is just a vehicle for top-down information flows.497
Contrary to what happened for Rousseau, the amount of media coverage dedicated to Bob after its498
launch has been limited, and the platform has been updated only once since, in early June 2017. As499
elections were approaching in early 2018, all talk about the app had disappeared from the official press500
releases of the party, and the use of Bob remained limited. The only section that is constantly updated501
contains a daily video with commentary of the political press. The disconnect between the extent of502
openness shown through primary elections, and the limitations of their online offer is striking: the use503
of a closed platform open to anybody does not seem able to contribute to internal party democratization.504
In the March 2018 election a PD-led coalition became the third political bloc in the country, with505
22.9% of votes, 7% less than in 2013. While this political defeat cannot be blamed on the failure of506
their online platform, this could be the right occasion for the adoption of more open platform politics,507
as a strong internet presence might counterbalance the loss of identity due to the party’s ideological508
transformation.509
6. Discussion and conclusion510
Overall, movement-parties like Podemos and M5S distinguish themselves from institutionalised par-511
ties not only by adopting a more horizontal organisational structure, but also by practicing a more open512
form of platform politics. Yet, despite the perceived value of inclusive decision-making, movement-513
party leaders are reluctant to fully decentralize control of the party. Both example of movement-based514
party that we examined embody an eclectic mix of organisational features that straddle the line between515
stratarchy and federation. Differences are also present, since the M5S leadership seems to exercise a516
tighter control over its elected representatives than Podemos’ lean structure, while the level of decisional517
power accorded to the internet members seems to be higher in the Italian movement, even if votes have518
tended to be plebiscitary. Moving forward, the challenge for these parties resides in how to institution-519
alize party organization without losing internal democracy both on the ground and online, as in case of520
failure the sanctions from the electorate might be severe.521
As for the two more institutionalised parties, PSOE’s more open approach places it ahead in its devel-522
opment of credible platform politics than the more streamlined product offered by the Italian PD with its523
app Bob. Both have developed platforms to facilitate internal organisational changes that wrestle power524
from party leaders and put it in the hands of rank-and-file members. Institutionalised parties are still525
able to exploit members’ low expectations regarding their internet-based tools, and do not seem to face526
additional sanctions at the moment, although the limited use of platform politics has certainly not helped527
them navigate their electoral crisis. However, the situation might change in the next few years, as non-528
technological cohorts are replaced by cohorts of digital natives whose political socialization happens529
largely on the internet, and for whom the existence of movement-parties is natural.530
Figure 2 shows the movement parties (Podemos and M5S) and the institutionalised parties (PSOE and531
PD) in their responsiveness to techno-political changes in line with their party organisation structure (x-532
axis) and the type of platform politics (y-axis) that they have followed. Going forward, a spatial analysis533
might be the best way to assess the difference between different formations, through the elaboration of534
appropriate metrics.535
To understand how techno-political changes are affecting party dynamics, we need to consider how536
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Fig. 2. Position of Podemos,M5S, PSOE and PD in the organisational model of party-based platform politics.
platforms to involve party members in internal decisions and organize collective action, what we call538
platform politics, is one type of response to the crisis of representation. We have developed a framework539
to show that parties that coexist in the same party systems, but are at two opposite stages of institution-540
alisation, can practice platform politics to consolidate control over citizen participation within the party,541
or to make participation more inclusive and meaningful for rank-and-file party members.542
We suggest that platform politics have been particularly attractive for movement-parties, that imple-543
ment shared decisional authority over the direction of the party, amidst frustration with establishment544
parties that lack internal democracy. Generally, parties have been experimenting with hybrid organisa-545
tional models, centralizing some core functions to party leaders, but de-localizing other decisions. We546
also observed these parties’ adoption of open and closed platform politics, with some tightly structured547
forms of citizen engagement, while opening up other channels for participation. Embracing platform548
politics can satisfy members’ demands for more engagement and representation, but also comes with a549
series of new challenges for parties.550
This is especially evident in the slippage that takes place between the positive language used by parties551
in the internal documents and blog posts that describe their platform. During our analysis a series of552
details emerged, that show the internal contradictions in the adoption of the new tools. In Italy it can be553
seen, for the PD, in its general lack of internet proficiency, to the point of having programming errors in554
the platform; while for M5S it can be seen, for example, in the limited participation of the membership555
base in a series of online votes, which collides with their claims of extreme openness. On the other side556
in Spain, Podemos has arguably been the most successful of the four, but has not escaped accusations557
of centralism, while PSOE’s had to face challenges of technological and ideological nature in its early558
forays into platform politics, resulting in limited participation.559
Moving forward, we propose several questions that are relevant to future studies of platform poli-560










Galley Proof 4/01/2019; 13:23 File: ip–1-ip180093.tex; BOKCTP/ljl p. 16
16 A. Lioy et al. / Platform politics: Party organisation in the digital age
traditional activists? If there are differences, how do parties weigh deliberations made through online562
platforms against forms of offline decision-making? Surveys can help us develop a demographic profile563
of a party’s platform users, and see whether they constitute a cohesive constituency that can be targeted564
through different kinds of involvement techniques.565
We would also like to know, since parties adopt platform politics to appeal to voters, are these efforts to566
expand online participation rewarded with electoral success? Do parties perform better at the polls when567
they rely on platforms to decide candidate lists and coordinate mobilization strategies? The evidence568
offered by this paper shows that this might be the case, but it refers to a small sample of cases over a569
short period of time. Furthermore, comparing the electoral success of parties that practice open or closed570
platform politics can provide insights about how voters evaluate promises of internal party democracy.571
The relationship of a party’s ideology to its use of platforms also warrants further study. Parties like572
M5S offer the scaffolding of a lean party program, but claim to represent citizens on the left and the right.573
Does a vague ideological commitment determine electoral success or does ideology get in the way once574
the online organization reaches a certain size? Further, can a form of partisan platform politics be adopted575
successfully on the fringes of the political spectrum? These questions will probably be best answered576
once the adoption of platform politics becomes more widespread across European party systems, but it577
would be important to offer an assessment based on the current situation.578
Last, and going beyond electoral strategy, when online platforms play a larger role in parties’ inter-579
actions with members, but are also susceptible to cyberattacks, how are parties keeping them secure?580
How must parties respond to trolls, hate speech and threats of violence that we observe daily on social581
media such as Twitter or Facebook? Answering these questions will require placing these challenges582
into context and comparing the strategic responses of political parties to other institutions that use online583
platforms for organizing politics.584
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